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diff --git a/ccai-2507.12713.pdf b/ccai-2507.12713.pdf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7d50d46 --- /dev/null +++ b/ccai-2507.12713.pdf @@ -0,0 +1,693 @@ +The Case for Contextual Copyleft: Licensing Open Source Training Data and Generative AI + +Grant Shanklin1,2, Emmie Hine1,3,4, Claudio Novelli1, Tyler Schroder1,2, Luciano Floridi1,3 + +1 Digital Ethics Center, Yale University, 85 Trumbull St, New Haven, CT 06511 +2 Department of Computer Science, Yale University, 51 Prospect St, New Haven, CT 06511 +3 Department of Legal Studies, University of Bologna, Via Zamboni 27/29, 40126 Bologna, Italy +4 Center for IT & IP Law, KU Leuven, Sint-Michielsstraat, 6 30000 Leuven, BE + +Email for correspondence: grant.shanklin@yale.edu + +Abstract +The proliferation of generative AI systems has created new challenges for the Free and Open Source +Software (FOSS) community, particularly regarding how traditional copyleft principles should apply +when open source code is used to train AI models. This article introduces the Contextual Copyleft AI +(CCAI) license, a novel licensing mechanism that extends copyleft requirements from training data to +the resulting generative AI models. The CCAI license offers significant advantages, including +enhanced developer control, incentivization of open source AI development, and mitigation of open- +washing practices. This is demonstrated through a structured three-part evaluation framework that +examines (1) legal feasibility under current copyright law, (2) policy justification comparing traditional +software and AI contexts, and (3) synthesis of cross-contextual benefits and risks. However, the +increased risk profile of open source AI, particularly the potential for direct misuse, necessitates +complementary regulatory approaches to achieve an appropriate risk-benefit balance. The paper +concludes that when implemented within a robust regulatory environment focused on responsible AI +usage, the CCAI license provides a viable mechanism for preserving and adapting core FOSS +principles to the evolving landscape of generative AI development. + +Keywords +Copyleft, Open source, Free Software, Generative AI, Responsible AI + + 1 + 1. Introduction +With the recent increase in the number (Gozalo-Brizuela and Garrido-Merchan 2023) and power +(Bandi, Adapa, and Kuchi 2023) of generative AI systems, the open source community faces new +challenges in responding effectively. There is considerable discussion regarding the adoption of open +source generative AI models, particularly given the substantial opportunities and risks that accompany +making these systems open (Eiras, Petrov, Vidgen, Schroeder, et al. 2024; Floridi et al. 2025). Some +participants in the debate suggest shifting the focus away from open source generative AI, emphasizing +the need for responsible AI through behavioral use licensing instead (Contractor et al. 2022). +Questions persist about how the open source community should manage models trained on open +source code (a practice notably illustrated by GitHub’s CoPilot, as discussed in Section 4.2). This +dialogue focuses on preserving and adapting the rules, principles, and practices of the Free and Open +Source Software (FOSS) movement to navigate the evolving technical landscape introduced by +generative AI. + + One way the FOSS movement has historically protected free software is through “copyleft” +licenses. These licenses require that derivative works be distributed under the same open source license +as the original work. This safeguards free and open source software because copyleft propagates +licenses from source material to derivative works, creating a viral effect where both original and +derivative works remain free and open (Phillips 2007). If attributes such as “freedom” and “openness” +are desirable for generative AI systems, then copyleft may provide a promising mechanism for the +FOSS community to uphold traditional software freedoms and extend their normative commitments +into the emerging field of generative AI. + + This paper examines whether such an extension of copyleft principles is desirable and explores +potential mechanisms for achieving it. The Contextual Copyleft AI (CCAI) license is proposed, which may +cover both traditional software and generative AI contexts. Then, the challenges of evaluating licenses +that cross contextual boundaries are discussed, considering the legal and policy considerations in each +context. This leads to an argument about how such a license should be evaluated. Next, this structured +evaluation is completed for the CCAI license. The analysis concludes that the license could be +beneficial, particularly when it is used within a strong regulatory environment. The license provides +developers with greater control over how their code is used, encourages the development of open +source generative AI systems, and addresses concerns related to openwashing. Regulating the +responsible use of AI would address the risk-benefit imbalance inherent in copyleft, as highlighted by +the evaluation. This license highlights emerging cases where carefully constructed and thoughtfully + + 2 + evaluated copyleft licenses cross contextual boundaries, offering essential insights into how to preserve +and adapt free and open source norms, principles, and practices in a changing technological landscape. + +2. The Contextual Copyleft AI (CCAI) License +This section proposes a new open source license that harnesses the features of copyleft to enable +developers to allow only open source generative AI models to train on their code. The copyleft scheme +enables copyright holders to permit users of their software to use, modify, and redistribute their code +in any way, provided that the modified or redistributed version is licensed under the same terms as +the original work (Stallman 2002). Fundamentally, copyleft is a mechanism that leverages the existing +copyright system to protect and promote the freedom of users to run, copy, distribute, study, change, +and improve software. + + We will refer to the proposed license as the Contextual Copyleft AI (CCAI) license, a name that +draws on this license’s ability to cross technical and legal contexts. This ability necessitates a nuanced +evaluation of this license in the sections that follow. The full license text and a clause that can be added +to existing open source licenses are included in the appendix of this paper. The CCAI license consists +of three main components: + + 1. Software freedom: Users can run the software, modify the code to fit their needs, and + distribute copies of the software. + + 2. Copyleft requirement: Any verbatim copy, modified version, derivative work, or model trained + on this code must also be wholly licensed under CCAI with no additional restrictions. This + includes a description of the training data, the code used to train and run the model, and the + model’s parameters for generative AI models.1 + + 3. Distribution clarification: Any distributed CCAI software must include source code or provide + a way to access it. Providing access to software over the network is considered equivalent to + distributing the software. + +The CCAI license incorporates a copyleft, share-alike clause to propagate open source requirements +from training data to the AI model itself. It adheres to the open source norm of imposing terms on +distribution without using code to protect software freedom via an extended definition of “distribute.” +Furthermore, it enhances existing open source copyleft licenses by explicitly defining terms related to + +1 The description of the training data is inspired by the Open Source Initiative’s “Open Source AI” definition found at +https://opensource.org/ai/open-source-ai-definition. Description should generally include what data was used to train +the model, where the data originated, how it was selected and obtained, and discussion of any training or fliting methods. + + 3 + generative AI, such as including non-code aspects of an AI model in the definition of “entire work,” +which helps enable developers to freely share their code online while preventing the unconstrained +training of AI models with their work. This is based on the premise that using code to train generative +AI models is not considered fair use, as discussed above. Note that adding the CCAI clause to an +existing open-source license effectively creates a new variant of the license. Care should be taken to +ensure compatibility with other open-source licenses, as some existing licenses (such as the GPL) do +not permit additional restrictions beyond their stated terms. + + The first component of the license is software freedom, defined as allowing users to “run the +software, modify the code to fit their needs, and distribute copies of the software.” This establishes +the license’s goal and ensures that the usage rights of the code are granted to the software user +unconditionally, in accordance with all other open source licenses. This provision is essential for +making the license open source and supporting all four software freedoms. + + The second component of the license is the copyleft requirement, which mandates that “any +verbatim copy, modified version, derivative work, or model trained on this code must also be wholly +licensed under CCAI, with no additional restrictions.” This requirement closely resembles the copyleft +stipulations in the GNU General Public License (GPL) and Affero General Public License (AGPL) +licenses,2 with the added categorization of AI models as part of derivative works. This definition would +impose share-alike terms on AI models if using code for training is not deemed fair use (if such training +were fair use, the original copyright holder’s license conditions could not apply to the model). +However, while the courts have yet to determine whether this training constitutes fair use, it is crucial +to include this clarification. The most significant addition to the fundamentals of the GPL and AGPL +is the second part of this component, which outlines the specific elements that must be licensed under +CCAI, particularly for AI models. The open sourcing must encompass “a description of the training +data, the code used to train and run the model, and the model’s parameters” under the same license +without additional restrictions. This definition was based on the Open Source Initiative’s definition of +Open Source AI.3 This definition helps combat open-washing, because it specifies the minimum +threshold for what counts as an open source model in the eyes of a copyleft license. + + The third component of the license is the distribution clarification, a clause taken from the +AGPL license that categorizes accessing software over the network as distributing the software being +accessed. This clarification is essential to ensure that model users’ access via the internet is considered + +2 These are two popular OSS licenses, with AGPL targeted towards network-facing software. +3 https://opensource.org/ai/open-source-ai-definition + + 4 + “distributed” rather than being used by the developer. Otherwise, a model trained on data licensed +under CCAI could allow users to access it through a website without requiring the model to be open +source, as these obligations come into effect upon distribution. + +3. Evaluating Licenses Propagating Between Contexts +Licenses that are designed to propagate between works in different technical and legal contexts pose +unique challenges in evaluating their legal and policy implications. This section argues that the +changing context of such licenses necessitates three components. First, a legal analysis is conducted +to determine whether the propagation mechanism is permissible within the existing legal framework. +Second, a policy analysis is performed to assess the individual benefits of copyleft within each context. +This analysis must then be synthesized to determine the overall desirability of such licenses. While the +necessity of the legal analysis is straightforward, the policy consideration is more nuanced. An open +source license may be desirable in its original context and be able to propagate to another context, but +the license may not be desirable in that new context. There are additional considerations, as the +primary justification for copyleft licenses is necessarily context-dependent; therefore, the rationale for +a license will change as it propagates between contexts. After introducing this framework for +evaluating licenses that propagate across different technical and legal contexts, it will be applied to the +CCAI license proposed above. + + Technical contexts refer to sets of software that encompass work with similar risks of being +made open source. For instance, traditional software refers to software that is commonly open sourced +today, including desktop applications, computer science tools, and server software. The risks +associated with traditional open source software may include security vulnerabilities, dependency +management challenges, and concerns regarding project sustainability (Zajdel, Costa, and Mili, 2022). +Another context could be generative AI because the risks of releasing a generative AI model as open +source would be fundamentally different; the risks are focused on the harm that could be caused either +by humans using the model or by a misaligned model itself (Amodei et al. 2016). These technical +contexts may or may not exist within the same legal contexts. Typically, technologies operating in +various technical contexts are governed by the same overarching legal framework, although specific +regulatory requirements may differ. + + The first component in evaluating a license designed to propagate between works in different +contexts is a legal evaluation of the feasibility of the propagation mechanism. While the necessity of +such analysis is self-evident, the examination itself may prove complex. This evaluation must primarily + + 5 + establish two elements: first, that the work to which the license propagates qualifies as a derivative of +the original work under applicable copyright law; and second, that the incorporation of the original +work within the derivative work falls outside the scope of the fair use doctrine. If these conditions are +satisfied, it can generally be concluded that the license governing the original work may impose legal +obligations on its use within the derivative work, including the enforcement of share-alike provisions. + + The second component is a policy evaluation of the use of copyleft in each context +individually. This must be done in each context individually because different technical contexts +present fundamentally different risk profiles that affect the cost-benefit analysis underlying the +justification of free software. These varying risks mean that the same copyleft license may be justified +in one context but unjustified in another, even when applied to functionally related software. The +conclusions from the separate policy evaluations must be considered jointly in determining whether +such a license should be used. + + Copyleft licenses are politically justified by their ability to protect and promote free and open +source software.4 Thus, the justification for using copyleft within a specific context depends on the +rationale for using free and open source software in that context. If the use of free software generally +can’t be shown to be beneficial in a technical and legal context, then copyleft can’t be shown to be +beneficial either. Furthermore, the justification of free software must also consider the risks associated +with making a piece of software open source. Thus, when technical contexts change, the specifics of +the justification for free software, and therefore the justification for using copyleft, must change as +well. The overarching argument in support of free software may remain unchanged; however, the +specifics of the argument must evolve either way. For instance, copyleft on a traditional piece of +software may be justified by a pragmatic argument regarding the quality of software produced by free +and open source communities. If this license propagates to a generative AI system, the justification +may or may not change, remaining pragmatic or taking on moral terms instead. However, the specifics +of the argument must change due to the different fundamental risks associated with making the +software open source. Therefore, the policy evaluation must be conducted individually for each +technical context. + + The third component is a policy analysis of copyleft propagation as a whole. While the policy +analysis justifying the use of copyleft and open source must be conducted individually in each context, +the results should be considered collectively to make a final determination as to whether the license + +4 https://www.gnu.org/licenses/licenses.html + + 6 + should be used or not. This synthesis must evaluate the specific benefits and drawbacks of the +propagation mechanism itself, including: whether it empowers developers by giving them appropriate +control over how their work is used across contexts; whether it creates positive incentives for open +source development in the new context; whether it helps maintain the integrity of open source +principles as they extend to new technologies; and whether these benefits of cross-context propagation +outweigh any tensions created by applying the same license across different risk profiles. The synthesis +should conclude with a holistic assessment of whether the propagation serves the overarching goals +of the FOSS community. + +4. Contextual Copyleft from Traditional Software to Generative AI +In this section, we evaluate the proposed CCIA license using the three-part analysis described in the +previous section. First, we examine the legal mechanisms through which copyleft licenses could extend +from training data to AI models, focusing on the critical question of whether AI training constitutes +fair use under US copyright law. This legal analysis proceeds under the assumption that such training +does not automatically qualify as fair use, allowing us to explore how licensing terms might apply. + + Second, we evaluate the use of copyleft licenses in each context individually—traditional +software and generative AI—to understand how the justification for these licenses changes across +contexts. This comparative analysis reveals significant differences in the risk profiles between +traditional open source software and open source AI, particularly regarding the potential for direct +misuse and harm generation. + + Finally, we synthesize these analyses to demonstrate that a copyleft license that propagates to +AI systems offers three key benefits: it grants developers greater agency over how their code is used +in AI development, stimulates the creation of open source generative AI systems, and combats “open- +washing” practices. Practical enforcement of the CCAI license against AI models trained on publicly +available data might be challenging due to difficulties in detecting unauthorized usage. However, even +in cases where enforcement is challenging, the existence of clearly articulated license terms can serve +as an effective deterrent against non-compliant use by law-abiding entities. We also acknowledge that +the increased risks associated with open source AI, particularly the potential for direct misuse, require +consideration of complementary regulatory approaches. We conclude by arguing that responsible AI +regulation can work alongside copyleft licensing to better align the risks and benefits of free software +principles in the context of generative AI. + + 7 + 4.1. Legal Analysis +Consider the case of a developer trying to prevent their publicly published work from being used to +train generative AI models. What legal tools are available to this person, and under what circumstances +can they be used? + + Under United States (US) copyright law, authors of original works receive several exclusive +rights, codified in 17 U.S.C. § 106. These include the rights to reproduce the work, prepare derivative +works based on it, distribute copies to the public, and publicly perform or display the work. However, +these rights are subject to statutory limitations, including exceptions such as fair use and compulsory +licensing schemes that serve broader social and economic interests. Copyright automatically applies to +original works when they are fixed in a tangible medium, including digital formats such as online +content. This means that any original code published online is immediately protected. Licenses specify +the rights that are legally reserved for the copyright holder and grant other rights to users of the work, +often with attached terms and conditions. In the case of copyleft, this arrangement is reversed via a +license, with all rights granted to the user on the condition that derivative works are released under +the same license. + + Fair use is the primary limitation of licenses serving as a method to grant developers greater +control over how their code is used. Licenses, as contracts between the copyright owner and the +software user, can only place terms on rights reserved for the copyright holder. Under US copyright +law, the doctrine of fair use, determined by a set of four standards, allows an existing work to be used +to create a new work such that it is no longer considered a derivative work of the original if the new +work is sufficiently “transformative.” Therefore, the original copyright holder cannot impose +conditions on how their work is used if the new work qualifies as fair use. + + Regarding generative AI, if it becomes established through the courts or legislation that using +code to train a model is always fair use of that training data, the discussion of licenses in this context +becomes irrelevant. Licenses would be unable to restrict what models can train on, given that publicly +available code is unrestricted. However, there is uncertainty about whether training models on code +is, or should be, regarded as fair use (Charlesworth 2024). For instance, some argue that the +substantially similar relationship between the input and output of a model, the commercial purpose +of many AI, models, and how models can replace the source material in the market suggest that +training on copyrighted material may not qualify as fair use (Shen 2024). + + The May 2025 US Copyright Office report provides crucial (although non-binding) guidance +on this uncertainty. The report concludes that training AI models on copyrighted works “clearly + + 8 + implicates the right of reproduction,” explicitly rejecting any blanket fair use protection for AI training +(US Copyright Office 2025). The Office emphasized that the reproduction right is triggered when +copyrighted works are copied into training datasets, regardless of whether those copies are retained +after the training process is complete. This finding directly challenges the argument that AI training +constitutes non-expressive use, exempt from copyright concerns. The report further notes that +commercial uses creating competing content are less likely to qualify as fair use, while research and +non-commercial uses receive more favorable treatment—a distinction particularly relevant for +commercial code generation models. + + With the assumption that this sort of training is not fair use, we can hypothesize that +developers can use licenses to restrict how their code is used to train generative AI models. In this +case, generative AI models trained on code could plausibly be considered derivative works of the +training data, although this interpretation remains legally unsettled, as the exact code from the training +data is not present in the model’s codebase and is never technically executed by the model. A similar +conclusion as to the ability of open source licenses to propagate to AI models has been found where +Benhamou argues “when the AI model incorporates open code into its program or open data into its +training dataset, there is a risk of propagation, i.e. a risk that the entire model or the input data become +fully open, as the AI model or the input can be considered as derivative of the open code or data, +whose license requires derivatives to remain open” (Benhamou 2024). + + The uncertainty surrounding whether the use of open source code as training data constitutes +fair use warrants consideration in its own right. The current confusion in the legal landscape naturally +leads developers to restrict licenses defensively, potentially hindering both AI innovation and open +source collaboration. A clear, purpose-built license can overcome this confusion by providing explicit +guidance that operates effectively under multiple legal scenarios. If training is not deemed fair use, +then licenses become the primary mechanism for controlling the use of AI training. A license +specifically addressing AI training for code generation models would provide clear guidance to all +parties, potentially increasing the pool of code available for training while respecting developer +preferences. However, if courts ultimately determine that training AI models constitutes fair use, such +licensing terms would have no legal force. And it is worth noting that jurisdictions outside the US, +such as the EU, provide explicit text and data mining (TDM) exceptions, which permit data mining +unless right-holders explicitly opt-out through licensing terms. Thus, the CCAI license terms could +effectively serve as an explicit opt-out of such statutory exceptions under EU law. Therefore, we see + + 9 + legal value in such a license, regardless of how the US courts ultimately rule on the question of fair +use. + +4.2. Policy Analysis in Each Context +The FOSS community generally agrees on the benefits of FOSS, which, according to the community, +include reliability, security, and low cost (AlMarzouq et al. 2005). However, sub-movements of the +community disagree on the intellectual justification for FOSS. The free software (FS) movement +presents moral claims to advocate for free software as defined above. Then, there is the open source +(OS) movement, which offers pragmatic arguments regarding the value of free software. The +differences can be summed up as “open source is a development methodology; free software is a +social movement,” but their “practical recommendations” are largely similar (Stallman 2002). + + The FS movement argues for free software based on what Richard Stallman describes as the +“Golden Rule” applied to software development. He argues that proprietary software is destructive +insofar as it “reduces the amount and the ways that a program can be used” and, as a result, reduces +the wealth humanity derives from the program (Stallman 2002). He ties this to Kantian ethics, arguing +that a good citizen does not use destructive means, such as proprietary software, to become wealthier. +With this, he concludes that “programmers have the duty to encourage others to share, redistribute, +study, and improve the software we write” (Stallman 2002). Another way that this has been formulated +is to start from the premise that software has permeated society, and, under a proprietary model, +software producers can control the availability of and access to software. As a result, “we are beholden +to these producers to run our modern society and are theoretically at their whim” (Heyns 2012). +Proponents of FS argue that this outcome is undesirable. Instead, software should be regarded as +infrastructure, as it is essential for societal participation and engagement. Thus, the assertion is made +that society should regulate access to the software “infrastructure” rather than software companies. +This approach helps prevent what has been termed “the digital divide,” wherein select groups of +people have access to the broad digital ecosystem (James 2003). + + The OS movement advocates for free software from a strictly pragmatic or utilitarian +framework, arguing that free software is more beneficial to society than proprietary software. Software +plays a critical role today, making society interested in the quality and reliability of the software that is +produced and used. OS advocates argue that making source code freely available online for public +collaboration results in high-quality and highly reliable software. The OS community generally posits +that this is due to the ability to peer review software and provide more timely fixes because more + + 10 + developers can review source code in search of bugs and security risks. When these issues are +identified, a distributed community can work together to create solutions, rather than a select group +within a specific company addressing the problem. The idea that a distributed community can lead to +better software outcomes is summed up in the famous Linus’s Law: “Given enough eyeballs, all bugs +are shallow” (Raymond 1999). OS is distinct from FS in that it does not make moral claims, but is +based on pragmatic claims regarding which development model will yield the highest quality and most +reliable software. + + The primary risks of releasing certain pieces of traditional software as open source include +security vulnerabilities and software misuse (Zajdel, Costa, and Mili 2022). Regarding security +vulnerabilities, the risk of malicious actors discovering and exploiting these vulnerabilities can be +mitigated by allowing multiple developers to review the code and identify and fix bugs. Thus, “open +source does not pose any significant barriers to security but rather reinforces sound security practices +by involving many people that expose bugs quickly and offers side-effects that provide customers and +the community with concrete examples of reusable, secure, and working code” (Clarke, Dorwin, and +Nash 2009). + + Moving from the traditional software context to generative AI, the risk profile changes. The +security risks of open source AI are non-negligible, with a survey revealing that 10% of IT decision- +makers have accidentally installed malicious code in their organizations through the use of open source +AI tools.5 Furthermore, the risk of actors using the code for malicious purposes is a concern that is +less directly countered by the benefits of open source software and is more challenging to mitigate. +Once open source software is out in the world, there is by definition no way that the developers can +control its use; while Meta’s Llama terms of service ostensibly prohibit its use for military purposes, +researchers associated with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army were still able to use it to create a +tool to gather and synthesize intelligence (Wilson and Hine 2025). + + Additional risks associated with open source AI include misuse, where software is used in a +technically unintended manner to inflict harm. When it comes to OSS related to generative AI, there +are several pathways to explicit harm, including the exploitation of security vulnerabilities and the +ability to create harmful content, particularly given the challenges of rolling back or updating models +(Eiras, Petrov, Vidgen, Witt, et al. 2024). The possibility of generating harmful content or using a +foundation model for malicious activities is particularly concerning given the nature of such misuse. + +5 https://www.anaconda.com/lp/state-of-enterprise-open-source-ai + + 11 + This type of misuse is primarily direct, contrasting with actor-dependent misuse seen in traditional +software. For example, if a foundation model is fine-tuned on a company’s emails, it may generate +highly effective phishing emails, posing a more significant threat to unsuspecting employees. This +scenario differs fundamentally from using an open source email client to send phishing emails. Here, +the open source technology in the case of generative AI is being used to amplify harm. In contrast, in +the traditional software case, the open source software operates as intended but is misused by the +actor to inflict damage. The risk of this explicit misuse in generative AI is significantly higher compared +to traditional software. + +4.3 Synthesizing the Analysis +The legal analysis has shown that the CCAI license can propagate from training data to a generative +AI model itself, while the policy analysis has shown strong support for the open-sourcing of traditional +software, highlighting both substantial benefits and risks in the context of open source AI. The +particular risk of direct misuse stands out as a significant concern, particularly in the context of open +source AI, compared to traditional software, which could complicate the justification for open source +approaches in the generative AI context. In this section, we will take these insights and show that the +CCAI license could benefit both the open source and AI development communities when used in +particular regulatory schemes. The promise such a license holds for both communities is first argued, +and then a discussion of regulatory schemes follows. + + This type of copyleft license offers three key advantages. First, it would give developers +enhanced control over how their code is incorporated into generative AI development. Second, it +would promote the development of genuinely open source generative AI systems. Third, it would help +combat “open-washing” practices that dilute the real benefits that open source generative AI systems +can provide. + + First, a copyleft license that propagates from traditional software to generative AI systems +provides an important mechanism to give developers greater control over how their code is used in +AI systems. Today, when developers open source their code, they lose control over what types of +generative AI models are trained on their code and for what purposes those AI models are employed. +On the one hand, this is a feature, not a bug. Open source licenses are explicitly designed to allow the +unrestricted use of code, enabling others to use the original work in new and innovative ways. At the +same time, developers often do not want their work to contribute to nefarious ends, which could +occur if their code is used to train a generative AI model intended to cause harm, for example. This + + 12 + has led some developers to add “no AI” clauses to existing licenses to prohibit using their code for +training an AI model.6 + + The tension within the open source community regarding the balance between freely sharing +software and caution towards unrestricted training on such software is evident in the backlash against +the release of CoPilot. GitHub CoPilot is an AI model developed specifically to generate code and, +consequently, requires a vast amount of code for its training data. This prompted GitHub to use code +from numerous open source repositories, asserting that the training of their model constituted fair use +and, therefore, the licensing terms of the code did not apply. Many in the FOSS community disagreed, +leading to a boycott of GitHub by many open source developers and a class-action lawsuit against +GitHub, Microsoft, OpenAI, and others involved in creating CoPilot (Class Action Complaint 3:22- +cv-06823). Some even argue that foundational models like CoPilot may discourage developers from +contributing to open source projects, as these models “exploit the principle of solidarity operating +within the movement” and have the potential to undermine the movement altogether (Novobilská +2023). An open source license with a copyleft clause would specify that it propagates from training +data to generative AI models, providing open source developers a middle ground between allowing +unconstrained training and limiting innovation and openness by restricting all training. + + Second, introducing and adopting a copyleft license that propagates from training data to AI +models would lead to more open source generative AI models—an outcome that the open source +community supports.7 It is well known that training generative AI models requires vast amounts of +data, so a model designed to generate code (such as GitHub’s CoPilot) would need substantial code +to train on. Open source repositories are currently the solution for model developers. Suppose such a +license were widely adopted within the FOSS community. Of course, the effectiveness of the CCAI +license depends heavily on its widespread adoption. If only a small subset of developers adopts it, +proprietary AI developers may simply avoid CCAI-licensed code. A license of this kind would outline +which portion of the open source code online is available for use by open source models during +training. This would create an incentive for the open sourcing of new generative AI models that +produce code, as it provides open source model developers with access to training data that proprietary +models cannot use. The incentivization and creation of open source generative AI models offer new +opportunities for external oversight, technical innovation, and decentralized control over AI +development compared to closed-source models (Seger et al. 2023). + +6 https://github.com/non-ai-licenses/non-ai-licenses +7 https://opensource.org/ai/open-source-ai-definition + + 13 + Third, a copyleft license of this type could provide more explicit, enforceable definitions for +open source AI, helping to combat “open-washing.” Open-washing refers to AI models that claim to +be open source by publicly sharing only one component, such as the model weights (Liesenfeld and +Dingemanse 2024). While this may allow users to download and run the model on their computers, it +fails to convey the comprehensive understanding of software freedom that the open source +community has cultivated; crucial contexts, including the code that trained the model and details of +the training data, are absent. The current language in copyleft licenses mandates that the “entire work” +be shared under the same license as the original, not just the portion of the software copied from the +original work. From a model developer’s perspective, the “entire work” could encompass not only the +model weights but also the underlying model architecture, supporting code, and details about the +training data. The interpretation of “entire work” as it applies to generative AI could broaden the +required components of an AI system that must be open to tackle the open-washing observed in the +AI development community effectively. + + These three advantages of the CCAI license must be considered in light of the above legal and +policy analysis. Specifically, the risk of direct misuse of open source AI is that it is used for malicious +purposes. The challenge is that open source licenses must not restrict how a technology can be used, +as defined by the principles of open source.8 However, while it can’t be prohibited, there is precedent +within the FOSS community resisting the misuse of open source software. For instance, a former +developer at Chef, a computer management software company, created open source tools that helped +customers work with Chef’s software. After leaving the company, he discovered a contract between +Chef and the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), prompting him to remove the code +with a note stating, “I have a moral and ethical obligation to prevent my source [code] from being +used for evil.”9 This decision caused an outage for multiple customers, leading Chef to republish an +older version of the open source tool’s source code on the company’s corporate GitHub account, an +action permitted by the software freedom provisions of the original license. However, it should be +noted that the developer was able to protest Chef’s collaboration with ICE because he had authority +over that code. + + One possible way to mitigate the risks of open source generative AI would be to introduce a +responsible AI use regulation that limits how open source models can be used to cause direct harm. +For instance, part of the EU AI Act prevents AI systems from using subliminal, manipulative, or + +8 https://opensource.org/osd +9 https://www.zdnet.com/article/no-source-code-for-evil-developers-pressure-chef-software-to-cut-ties-with-ice/ + + 14 + deceptive techniques that distort a person’s behavior and impair decision-making, causing significant +harm, or exploiting individuals or groups based on age, disability, or socio-economic conditions to +influence behaviors in a harmful way (European Union 2024). Although these provisions have been +criticized for a lack of specificity (Montag and Finck 2024), similar restrictions in the US could help +mitigate the risk of misuse of open source generative AI systems. This would help rebalance the risks +and benefits of open source generative AI closer to those of traditional open source software, allowing +for a stronger endorsement of copyleft in both contexts. + +5. Conclusion +The analysis presented in this article demonstrates that the Contextual Copyleft AI (CCAI) license +represents a promising approach to extending traditional copyleft principles into the domain of +generative AI development. Through our structured evaluation framework, we have determined that +such a license is legally feasible under current copyright law, assuming that AI training does not +constitute fair use, and offers substantial benefits to both the open source and AI development +communities. The license addresses three critical challenges facing the FOSS community in the age of +generative AI: providing developers with meaningful control over how their code is incorporated into +AI systems, creating incentives for genuinely open source AI development, and combating the dilution +of open source principles through open-washing practices. These advantages align with the +fundamental goals of the FOSS movement while adapting to the unique characteristics of generative +AI technologies. + + However, our policy analysis reveals that the risk profile of open source generative AI differs +significantly from that of traditional software, particularly regarding the potential for direct misuse, +where AI systems can be employed to generate harmful content or amplify malicious activities. This +increased risk profile challenges the traditional cost-benefit calculus that has historically justified +copyleft licensing in software development. The analysis suggests that while the benefits of open +source AI remain substantial—including enhanced oversight, innovation, and decentralized control— +the heightened risks require careful consideration and potentially complementary regulatory +mechanisms to achieve an appropriate balance. + + The path forward for implementing the CCAI license depends critically on the development +of comprehensive regulatory frameworks that address the responsible use of AI systems. Such +regulations, exemplified by provisions in the EU AI Act that restrict manipulative and exploitative AI +applications, could help mitigate the direct misuse risks that complicate the justification for open + + 15 + source AI. CCAI alone does not eliminate misuse risks—it ensures openness but cannot prevent +malicious use of openly released models. Thus, its practical effectiveness depends significantly on +complementary regulatory measures addressing responsible use of AI. Within such a regulatory +environment, the CCAI license emerges as a valuable tool for preserving the core values of software +freedom while adapting to the realities of modern AI development. This analysis thus contributes to +the broader discourse on maintaining the integrity and relevance of FOSS principles as technology +continues to evolve, demonstrating that thoughtful adaptation of traditional licensing mechanisms can +help navigate the complex challenges posed by generative AI while upholding the fundamental +commitments of the open source community. + + 16 + Appendix A: The CCAI License +The following is the text of the CCAI license designed to propagate from training data to generative +AI models. + + Contextual Copyleft AI (CCAI) License v1.0 + + Copyright (c) [year] [author] + + Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated + documentation files (the “Software”), to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, and/or sublicense copies + of the Software, subject to the following conditions: + + 1. Software Freedom. + Users are granted the freedom to run, study, modify, and distribute the Software, including modified versions, + for any purpose. + + 2. Copyleft Requirement. + Any distribution, publication, or making available of the Software — including exact copies, modified versions, + or derivative works — must be licensed in full under the terms of this CCAI License without imposing any + further restrictions. This requirement also applies to any model, dataset, or system that is trained on, derived + from, or incorporates the Software or its outputs. In the case of generative AI models, the obligation to apply + this license includes, at minimum, the disclosure of the model’s source code, a meaningful description of the + training data, and the model’s parameters, weights, and architecture. + + 3. Distribution Clarification. + Providing access to the Software or any covered model over a network or online service shall be considered + distribution and triggers the obligations of this License. + + 4. No Warranty. + The Software is provided “as is”, without warranty of any kind. + + 5. Preservation of License Notice. + Copies, modifications, and derivative works must retain this license notice. + +Appendix B: The CCAI Clause +The following is the text of the CCAI clause that can be added to existing open source licenses to +propagate the license from training data to generative AI models. + + Contextual Copyleft AI (CCAI) Clause + + If this software is used to train, fine-tune, or otherwise generate any machine learning model or generative AI + system, any resulting model, dataset, or system must be released under terms no more restrictive than this license. + This includes the requirement to make available the training code, a description of the data used in training, and + the model’s parameters and architecture. Providing access to such a model or its outputs via a network is + considered distribution and triggers this obligation. + + 17 + References + +“1-0-Github_complaint.Pdf.” n.d. 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